Nuclear proliferation is one of the major concerns on the United States (US) foreign policy agenda. This essay will examine the reasons that led the US to change its approach towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) under the Bush Administration. In other words, I will analyze the reasons that made President Bush to abandon the Clinton Administration's attitude which was mainly based on the spirit and letter of the 1999 William Perry's report and to adopt a harder line approach.

In the first part I present the context on which the comprehensive review of the US policy towards North Korea was required to Dr Perry. In this part I will also address the main aspects and recommendations of his report. In the second part I discuss the principal factors that affected George W. Bush to shift his policy to a harder position. First, I consider how the Pyongyang negotiation style was perceived by Washington as cheating and how this resulted in the main reason to abandon the Clinton “engagement” approach. Secondly, I present the impact of September 11 events on the language of US Foreign Policy as a clear evidence of the US fears of an uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons from rogue states to terrorist groups. Lastly, I revise the coherence between the Bush Administration attitude towards DPKR and other related initiatives. I conclude that all the reasons presented above should be understood from a domestic framework perspective where the necessity to differentiate the Republican and Democrat formula to deal with North Korea as well as private interests play a decisive role in shaping the US Foreign Policy.

Many efforts, few results. The attempt of Perry to guide the Clinton Administration.

The efforts to disarm North Korea started in the early 1980s with some satisfactory but transitory results such as the accession of North Korea to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Regime (NPT) in 1985 and the acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in 1992 (IISS 2004: 5). In December 1991, an agreement on a bilateral denuclearization was negotiated between North and South Korea . However this agreement was born dead. It had no effect and North Korea renounced officially to it in May 2003 (IISS 2004: 5).

As a result of North Korea 's attempt to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 the US promoted a bilateral agreement that was concluded in October 1994, the so-called Agreed Framework. This arrangement was based on the following terms: the US assumed the obligation to provide with Light –Water Reactor technology and heavy fuel oil to North Korea and in exchange the latter agreed to stop the nuclear weapons activity at Yongbyon (Howlett 2005: 511). Although Washington felt that Clinton engagement with North Korea was an error because the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program was never stopped and North Korea continued clandestine nuclear activities, it was the best among the worst options at that time. This deal had its credits; it not only avoided a catastrophic war but also created a forum where parties could engage in a less hostile diplomatic relation for several years (Laney and Shaplen 2003: 23-24). However, all those efforts vanished in October 2002 when North Korea announced that was conducting a secret nuclear program and in January 2003 withdrew from the NPT (IISS 2004: 5).

Being outside the NPT regime, with the Agreed Framework dead and making official statements about its nuclear ambitions, North Korea motivated the US to initiate the Six Party Talks. This group meets the US, Russia, China, Japan, North and South Korea and it is an attempt to create a multilateral fora to persuade North Korea to renounce the nuclear weapons program with the assurance of security and economic benefits (IISS 2004: 5).

The Perry Report was commissioned under the Clinton administration and was the result of the unsuccessful efforts to control North Korea . In November 1994 the Republican Party obtained the control of the American Congress. As a consequence Clinton found small support to ensure the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Moreover, the arrangement was not a treaty but an agreement between governments. This means that Clinton did not have to pursue the approval of the Senate to conclude it. According to Perry the reason why Clinton proceeded on that manner was to avoid the rejection of the congressmen who were particularly unhappy with that agreement (2003). This unhappiness was based on the economic cost of the obligations assumed (the transference of heavy fuel) that represented just for the first year between $ 10 to $ 15 million dollars from the US budget (Perry 2003). In addition to that in August 1998 North Korea tested a Taepo-dong missile over Japan (IISS 2004:14).

The failure of Clinton administration to conduct an effective policy towards North Korea prompted the White House to request in November 1998 from Dr William Perry - US Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997 and North Korea policy coordinator from 1998 to 2000 - a thorough study about US policy on the North of the Korean peninsula (IISS 2004: 14). According to Perry the main reason that is considered to promote his report is the test of the Taepo Dong in August 1998. However, he argues that the test of the long range missile over Japan was no more than the perfect excuse for those who opposed the Agreed Framework to stop the funding of the heavy fuel (US) and light water reactor (Japan) in order to push the agreement to its end (Perry: 2003).

It is also worthy to mention that previous to the Perry report in March 1999 another report coming from the Republican wing was made public: “The Armitage Report”, which was a reaction of the Perry report request. Assessing the North Korea situation, this report adopted a harder line than Perry and suggested that the US policy had to contain severe punishment when North Korea broke the 1994 agreement rules (Howard 2004: 810). In other words, it provided that in case of failure of the “Comprehensive Approach”, that is “if diplomacy fails” deterring North Korea with delivery systems and preemption should be considered as the following option (Armitage 1999).

On the other hand, the review team that worked under the orders of Dr Perry made extensive consultations with experts not only from the US but also from many countries with special interests in the North Korean Peninsula. In order to work with primary sources the team traveled to North Korea in May 1999 to understand the situation in situ (Perry 1999). The extensive review and recommendations of the Report were released in October 1999. According to the report there were several facts that created the necessity of a “fundamental review” (Perry 1999):

•  the need of a new US policy to deal with a situation because nothing has changed since the 1994 crisis (Perry 1999).

•  the change of leadership in DPRK. From the father Kim I1 Sung to his son Kim Jong I1 in 1994. That resulted in a more dictatorial regime and in a more deteriorated economy (Perry 1999).

•  the South Korea policy of engagement with the North created new opportunities for US, especially because South Korea is vital in the US strategy. No single plan could be thinkable if not through South Korea cooperation (Perry 1999).

•  the stronger concern of Japan in the case, particularly after the Taepo Dong missile test over its territory (Perry 1999).

•  the Chinese concerns about the dangers posed by North Korea 's nuclear weapons developments for the regional and global security (Perry 1999).

The continuing development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by North Korea required an urgent plan to avoid a growing instability in the region (Perry 1999). As a consequence, the team considered four different policies, but all of them were rejected:

No changes at all: this policy encouraged the continuity of the Agreed Framework proposition in order to verify its implementation. This was the manner on which North Korea would be kept controlled in the acquisition of fissile material. This proposal was rejected by the team because it considered that it was not going to be successfully sustained and that a near nuclear crisis was easily foreseen (Perry 1999).

The collapse of the DPRK: this proposal was based on the implementation of sanctions and diplomatic pressure to overthrow the regime. However, two reasons made this alternative excluded as a possible option. First, there was no proof that this kind of pressure would destabilize Kim Jong regime. People were living in miserable conditions and had no opportunity under a dictatorial regime to organize themselves for such enterprise. Secondly, the time that would take the conclusion of this option would allow North Korea to continue the development of it nuclear weapons program and to escalate the conflict in a way that only a war would be the real option (Perry 1999, 2003).

The most optimistic: this option considered that a reform in the DPRK such as a more market oriented policy and a democratic regime would allow the DPRK to join the international community. This policy of reforming was rejected for the same reasons that was rejected the previous one: it was very unlikely that this reform could occur and the time that would take was inconsistent with the time limits of the needed measures (Perry 1999, 2003).

Trading objectives: this option was the most rejected by the report. It was based on the offer previously made by DPRK of stopping the exports of missiles with the condition that US compensated in currency for the lost of those earnings. As the report remarks this policy would encouraged not only blackmail from North Korea but also for any other country that would engage in a proliferation activity (Perry 1999).

The proposal made on the report was made in consultation and support of the governments of Japan and South Korea (Perry 1999). The report proposed that the US would offer normal diplomatic relations to North Korea and to suspend the economic sanctions in exchange that North Korea agreed to stop the missile exports and to give up with its long-range missile force. In the case that those terms were not accepted by North Korea the report suggested that the US and its allies should engage in another strategy in order to maintain their security and to deal with the continuous threat (IISS 2004: 15). North Korea was quite interested in this approach and was willing to get the most of the economic benefits. However, it was more than conscious that its regime would suffer from a dramatic exposure in this kind of terms. In other words, as an exchange of the economic benefits North Korea would risk his regime by permitting its people to discover what was happening beyond the North Korean boundaries (Perry 2003).

Many steps forward were made by both sides. President Clinton invited Kim Jong I1 to the US and the latter sent Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok on his behalf. Once in America , Jo Myong Rok extended a personal invitation from Kim Jong I1 to President Clinton to visit Pyongyang . At that moment President Clinton was engaged in two major crises: North Korea and the Middle East . According to Perry, he couldn't deal with both at the same time and pursuing a Middle East agreement was his option. He sent to North Korea Secretary Madeleine Albright and in some way, according to Perry, President Clinton lost the momentum (Perry 2003).

Promoting the National Interest when thinking a Foreign Policy. The Bush approach.

As part of any election campaign there is a strong need to emphasize the failures of the opposite party that is in power. One ingredient that must be present in this recipe is a different approach to treat the same agenda. A presidential candidate needs to convince the voters that a new and more effective style will be employed to solve the issues that the party in power is unable to solve.

As a foreign policy advisor of the Republican candidate in the US primary elections of 2000, Condoleezza Rice, considered that the Clinton administration lacked a “consistent foreign policy” and had no clear priorities. She argued that “the absence of an articulated “national interest”…creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures” (2000: 46). She emphasized that a Republican administration should address American foreign policy from a “national interest” perspective and announced that one of the major priorities of the American national interest was the necessity to deal firmly with rogue states and hostile regimes which posed an imminent threat by developing weapons of mass destruction and interacting with terrorist groups (2000:47).

In March 2001 President Bush dismissed the “Sunshine” policy, that is the policy of South Korea to engage by peaceful means with its northern neighbor, and also argued he was no convinced by the North Korea's peaceful approach (Cha 2002: 79-80). According to Cha the Bush approach is based on the “Hawk engagement” strategy. It differs from the Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy in the following terms: the sunshine policy assumes that North Korea position is the result of insecurity. The abandonment of Russia after the Cold War, the extreme economic situation, starvation and political isolation make North Korea to develop nuclear programs as a mean of survival. As a consequence, engagement is the manner to reduce its insecurity. On the other hand, the Hawk engagement argues that the value of engagement is to make clear North Korea 's intentions, that is to continue its nuclear programs, invade Seoul and reunify the two Koreas under a communist regime. While the Sunshine policy understands engagement as a suitable way to improve the negotiations with Kim Jong I1, Hawks consider engagement as a useful manner to build a coalition for a future punishment (Cha 2002: 82-83). Richard Perle admits that the change of policy of the Bush Administration is justified simply because the Clinton policy was wrong. He argues that the structure of the Framework Agreement created a blackmail relationship “between a blackmailer and one who pays a blackmailer' (2003). He urges to move from Clinton policy which describes as follows: “…It was a playing field on which we were expected to pay the North Koreans not to do dangerous things and that is not a sound basis for a policy.” (2003).

If there was any doubt about the Bush Administration policy towards North Korea , the terrorist attacks of September 11 played a decisive role in the definition of a more hostile approach. On January 29 2002, on the State of the Union Address, President Bush affirmed:

“Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quite since September the 11 th . But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens … States like these, and their terrorist allies, constituted an axis of evil , arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger” (2002). [Emphasis added]

This language was not new in the Republican jargon. In 2000 Condoleezza Rice said: “Like East Germany , North Korea is the evil twin of a successful regime just across its border” (2000: 60). When President Bush used the term “evil” he meant a complete break with the former policy. In other words, an evil state should be treated as such: no food, no fuel and no construction of nuclear plants in exchange of false promises (Perle 2003). The events of September 11 produced a major change, not only towards North Korea but also in the American Foreign Policy as a whole (Perle 2003). According to Grant, the settlement of disputes as the role of diplomacy has been replaced in some degree by the resort of the use of force (2005:13). However, the use of force in the North Korea case appears as the least desirable option.

In October 2002, the US Assistant Secretary of States James Kelly on a visit to Pyongyang said that there was evidence that HEU program was conducted in secret in violation of the 1994 Agreement Framework (BBC News 2005). North Korea reacted in a conciliatory way offering the possibility that international inspectors would check that no nuclear activity was taken place (BBC News 2005). Once the US made public that North Korea accepted that a secret nuclear program was going on, Pyongyang offered to cease the HEU program if the US was willing to sign a pact of a nonaggression. The US decided not to reward that misconduct and rejected the dialogue until North Korea gave up the HEU program. One month later, the US reinforced its position and suspended the delivers of oil shipments established under the 1994 Agreement (Laney & Shaplen 2003: 17-18). In December North Korea expelled the IAEA nuclear inspectors and in January made public its withdraw from the NPT (BBC News 2005). The situation became critical because a nuclear North Korea not only threatens its neighbors but also can exports nuclear weapons or its technology to other states or even worse, to terrorist groups (ICG 2003).

At that moment the US was preparing its troops to Iraq and was not in position to deal with another crisis. Hence, to prevent an escalation of the conflict with North Korea the US proposed to initiate multilateral negotiations instead of bilateral ones. In a multilateral context the US would prevent blackmail from North Korea and would procure that more forces increase pressure to dissemble the North Korean nuclear program. From the North Korea perspective the reverse was true, hence it rejected multilateral negotiations and only offered bilateral negotiations with the Bush Administration (IISS 2004: 19).

Bush understands that the American efforts should be articulated in conjunction with those from allies and friends. In order to work on that direction President Bush launched in May 2003 the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to stop the proliferation of WMD and to avoid illicit trade, especially to terrorist groups. The states that are participating in this enterprise are: Australia , Canada , France , Germany , Italy , Japan , The Netherlands, Norway , Poland , Portugal , Russia , Singapore , Spain , the UK and the US (DFAT 2003). In July 2003 the second conference was held in Brisbane, Australia to coordinate a prospective international arrangement and the interception in High Seas of North Korean ships suspected of transporting nuclear material or nuclear weapons (McCormack 2004:171). The aim of the PSI is to present an innovative way to deal with countries that cheat on the fulfillment of international duties, or are reluctant to participate in non-proliferation regimes, or even willing to deal with non-states actors pursuing to obtain WMD (DFTA 2003).

This initiative strengthens particularly the coordination of the international community efforts to combat proliferation activities, especially in a situation where “arms control is dead” (Ungerer 2005:17). The Bush Administration approach was also reflected in the United Nations Security Council, which through the Resolution 1540 adopted on 28 th April 2004 creates a Committee to monitor the implementation of the Resolution. The resolution was adopted in order to reinforce multilateral treaties and to abide states in the fulfillment of their obligations on the following issues: arms control, disarmament and the prevention of proliferation of all kind of weapons of mass destruction (UNSC Res. 1540 [2004]).

Another important pillar of the US Foreign Policy under the Republican government is the deployment of a missile defense system (MDS) in order to prevent chemical and biological weapons and also any kind of terrorist attacks (Rice 2000: 61). The Pentagon is debating on the kind of protection and how well the tested system works. Currently, the US has deployed “six long-range, ground-based missile interceptors in Alaska and another two in Califormia” (Boese 2005).

According to the scenario described above one may ask how feasible is for Washington and Pyongyang to engage in a negotiation process when the “dialogue era” is outdated? The Bush Administration is not an administration of “words” but of “actions”. The give and take of a bilateral negotiation is inconsistent with the US position which is willing to build a strong missile defense system and is only willing to normalize relations with North Korea only if the latter dismantle all the nuclear facilities, stop all kind of nuclear activities and allow inspectors to verify the situation. It seems to be that those terms imply nothing to give and everything to take.

Comparing the Democrat and the Republican endeavors to deal with North Korea one may question what makes them adopt such different styles to achieve the same goal? Perhaps this question should be revised and we need to redefine first the “goals” of each Administration. This case illustrates one more time the intricate relationship between domestic affairs and Foreign Policy and how the different styles of diplomacy are mere instruments to concrete those objectives. In this line of reasoning one may ask what the interests behind the Bush Administration are. Who is lobbying in the aisles of the US Congress? Perhaps arms are not only the objective of “Arms Control and disarmament” but also a profitable industry.

The strong militarization of the US , the missile defense system, and all the technology developed and acquired, demand a very good reason to justify such enormous investment. A very good reason cannot arise from a peaceful environment but from a real an imminent threat that only a nuclear evil state is able to produce.

Conclusion

The different approach of the Bush Administration to deal with North Korea finds a strong reason in the necessity to differentiate its formula from the one employed by the Democrat Party. During the electoral campaign of 2000 Bush criticized Clinton 's approach towards North Korea . The same strategy was used during the primary elections of 2004 when Kerry highly opposed and criticized the Bush Administration approach towards the same issue. According to Choi, both parties want the same end but from different means. While Republicans base their strategy on preemption and Missile Defense, Democrats prefer international law, the universality of the NPT and the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea (2004: 64-65). While the necessity of differentiating Democrats from Republicans proposals is a partial truth, the other half rest on the complexity net of interests knitted behind each policy.

In the case of North Korea , the Perry report embodies the style through which the Clinton Administration negotiated with Pyongyang for two terms ergo, by no means, that policy was going to be continued by Bush. The unfortunate events of September 11 2001 made a contribution to a harder-line approach and to translate the pre-emptive doctrine into different kind of initiatives: the missile defense system was intensified and the Proliferation Security Initiative was set up among others.

Machiavelli and the world affairs have proven that diplomacy is not about being “nice” but to “get what you want”. In this reasoning it is remarkable the coherence of the Bush Administration approach, however, it is not certain up to what extend the US is ready to support this position by resorting to the use of force. Coercive diplomacy has a cost and in this particular case the escalation of the conflict is increasing the price.

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