Index :
1. Introduction
2. Ageing Population
2.1 The current impact of ageing in the developed world
2.2 The future impact of ageing in some advanced developing countries
3. Major Implications
3.1 Ageing, Fertility and Migration
3.2 Japan
4. In the Future
4.1 Possible Solutions
4.2 A place on the Agenda
5. Conclusion
1 . Introduction
As human beings we do not decide when to be born and almost never –because of cases of suicide- when to die. Both actions are biological conditions of our existence and as individuals we have no control over them. However, as members of a group, our ‘arrival' and ‘departure' from a society do have an impact on political decisions. In order to govern a population a state needs to preserve some order on its structure and this order is related, among others, with factors such as: fertility, ageing, migration and urbanization.
In the present essay I will discuss the impact of “ageing population” and its implications on the international security agenda. In the first part I will examine “ageing” as a potential generator of international security tensions. I will address “ageing” not only as a condition which is being experienced mainly by western and developed nations but also the manner it would affect advanced developing nations in the near future. I will argue that the major problem is posed in economic terms because the growth of elder population in contrast to the decrease of working population will jeopardize the survival of any social and welfare systems.
Owing to the fact that ageing does not occurs in isolation, in the second part of this essay I will analyze its connections with other factors such as fertility and migration. I will examine those relations under the light of some studies and projections and I will address the attention to the most alarming case: Japan . In the last part I will present different alternatives that have been considered to mitigate the consequences of ageing, and finally I will discuss the place that “ageing” is given in the international security agenda.
2. Ageing Population
2.1 The current impact of ageing in the developed world
The global population is in transition and the age structure is shifting: the young is falling and the elderly is rising (Batini, Callen and McKibbin 2005:1). From an individual perspective “ageing” can be defined as: “a set of predictable, gradual and inevitable changes in biologic and psychological functions, sometimes decremental, that occur in healthy persons with the passage of time” (Besdine 1994: 322). However, from a social perspective when we say that “the world is getting older”, ageing, means that the percentage of the population over 65 years old is increasing over years (Helgerson 2002). While in 2000 seven percent of the world population was over 65, in 2050 it is expected that those above 65 will achieve 16 percent. The industrialized world is actually experiencing the “ageing” of its population and its undesirable effects are expected in the very near future. In countries such as Japan , Italy and Germany the “elderly” is reaching nearly 20 percent of their whole populations (Helgerson 2002).
There are two factors that influence the increment of the aged population: the low rate of fertility and the low rate of mortality. In other words, fewer babies are born and less people are dying. The reason of low rate fertility in developed countries is the result of the consciousness and availability of contraceptive methods to women and the possibility of family planning. After the Second World War there was a fear that uncontrolled population growth could affect economic development and also stability (Keely 2003: 198). As a consequence, planning family efforts were promoted by some states and UN agencies with remarkable results. First in Rome in 1954 and then in Belgrade in 1965 the UN convened world population conferences inviting scientists in their individual capacity to promote scientific responses to the rapid growth of population (Finkle and McIntosh 2002: 12). Although their first aim was not to formulate population policies but to explore scientific alternatives later changed. In the 1970s the US aware of this problem contributed with millions of dollars to the UN and the conferences changed their scientific spirit to an intergovernmental mode (Finkle and McIntosh 2002: 12) It took no more than one generation to spread modern methods of contraception worldwide, which were successfully used by more than 60 percent of the world population with very positive results (Keely 2003: 199).
Life expectancy is the other factor influencing the low rate of mortality. The global life expectancy was increased during the last fifty years more rapidly than in the previous five thousands (Peterson 1999: 43). Good nutrition, access to health care and the innovation of technologies - such as fiber optics and other defense industry innovations that are being applied through the robotics to make older people full independence-, make that elders from the developed world increase exponentially their living expectations (Besdine 1994:322).
The major implication of an ageing population is that if working population -from 15 to 64 years old- is contracting and retired population –over 65- is expanding; the ratio of taxpaying workers to support the nonworking population will dramatically decrease (Helgerson 2002). Hence, if no effective policies are implemented to counteract the challenge of ageing, the global economy can be destabilized by increasing debts and/or higher taxes (Helgerson 2002).
Another important impact of aging population in developed countries with low-birth rate such as Japan, Germany, France, Britain and Italy is that although all of them possess military and economic capabilities to engage a war their societies are more than reluctant to accept any kind of causalities in the battlefield; what Luttwak name: “debellicized” societies (1994: 27). In this line of thought Peterson questions: “How many parents will allow their only child to go off to war? (1999: 50).
In a few words, population in developed countries is “getting older” and as a consequence there is special concern that their economies would suffer dramatic changes because the workforce won't be sufficient to maintain the actual ratio of their systems. Moreover, ageing population is not an exclusive demographic shift of advanced nations but also a future challenge for the advanced developing world.
2.2 The future impact of ageing in some advanced developing countries
Although the problem of ageing population is mainly identified in the developed world, statistics projects that the same problem will take place in some advanced developing countries in the next thirty years. Countries such as South Korea , Brazil , and Argentina will also experience this kind of change in the composition of their populations (Helgerson 2002). In central and eastern Europe the process will be accelerated by 2015 and at that time China will also be experiencing a fast ageing of its population (Helgerson 2002). From 2000 to 2025 the Chinese “old population” -65 and above- will reach 200 million people, that means that one seventh part of the Chinese's population will be senior citizens (Eberstadt 2001:50).
The difference of ageing population in developed and less developed countries is summarized by Eberstadt as follows: “Population aging, of course, will also occur in today's less developed regions. Current developed countries grew rich before they grew old; many of today's low-income countries, by contrast, look likely to become old first” (2001: 50).
3. Major Implications
3.1 Ageing, Fertility and Immigration
As presented in the first part of this essay ageing is the result of different factors that operates in conjunction to make elder population grows. One of those factors is “fertility”. The TFR (Total Fertility Rate) is used to measure and compare the fertility of different countries. The level of replacement is a TFR of 2.1. This figure indicates the number of children that a woman should have in order to replace the couple (Grant, Hoorens, Sivadasan, van het Loo, DaVanzo, Hale, Gibson and Butz 2004: 55).
Developed nations are suffering of “chronic low fertility”, the low rates they are experiencing have no precedent in history ( Nichiporuk 2000a: 6) . Italy and Spain in 1997 shared the lowest rate fertility in the world, only 1.2. In the same year Japan and Singapore registered 1.4 and 1.7 respectively (Nichiporuk 2000b: 14). While in Australia according to new research the TRF has stopped failing and is currently in 1.8, in Italy and Spain has reached 1.1 and in Germany , Austria , Switzerland have rates under 1.5 (Overington 2005: 3).
Developed nations are experiencing a TRF lower than 2.1, and as a consequence they are not replacing their population. Apart from the catastrophic changes that they would suffer in their economies because of the lack of workforce to support the elderly, the situation is aggravated for the lack of investment. While working age population has a tendency to save, older generations have in general terms the opposite attitude (Batini, Callen and McKibbin 2005: 16). According to Prof. Ross Guest, in Australia , “the ageing population would marginally slow the increase of living standards, but would never force it to stop or fall” (Dullroy 2005: 12).
Immigration is another important factor that instead of being a cause of ageing is a consequence of it. One of the reasons of why the US as a developed country does not share the TRF of Europe or Japan it is precisely because of its immigration policy. From 1960 to 1985 the TRF of the US decreased faster than in Europe and dropped under the level of replacement: 1.8. However, in the 1990s that level rebounded to achieve almost 2.1. This recovery is in part the result of the high fertility of immigrants that come from Latin America countries (The Economist 2004).
Europe is more reluctant to adopt the immigration policies that America does. As a consequence, the former is not recovering from the low fertility rate or the ageing population. On the other hand the US immigration policy has demonstrated to be an efficient instrument to diminish the negative impact of those factors in its system.
3.2 Japan
The situation in Japan is of major concern. Fertility rates are along with the lowest in the world. After a very short period of baby boom after the Second World War the TRF decreased dramatically. From 1947 to 1957 the TRF fell from 4.5 to 2.04 and during the 1990s dropped up to 1.53 (Ogawa 1993: 137). Takayama identifies three factors as the main causes of the decline of fertility: first, the small salary difference between men and woman; second, the hardships to combine work and care of children; third, the good social security system that provides good standard of living to old people (Takayama 1998 cited in footnote 3 in Faruqee and Muhleisen 2003: 187). The most important implication of this rate of fertility is that fewer workers would entry in the labor market. Faruqee and Muhleisen comment that: “The long run decline in the Japan 's birth rate implies that Japan will have both a declining and an ageing population” (Faruqee and Muhleisen 2003: 187). It is estimated that by 2025 there will be two working age person per one elderly. This proportion will position Japan in the “higher old-age dependency ration” than any other country in the developed world (Faruqee and Muhleisen 2003: 186).
Aged people are more likely to experience more illness and require more health services than the younger. As a result, the decline of mortality will demand financial and manpower resources to provide medical care to a more “vulnerable” individuals (Ogawa 1993: 139). Besides the increment of the cost of health care, the elder Japanese will demand human resources for the increasing number of aged patients that need intensive human care, such as those who suffer from “senile dementia” or are “bedridden” (Ogawa 1993: 139). One circumstance that distinguishes Japan from the rest of the developed societies and that can ameliorate the high demand of human resources is a Japanese tradition of living up to three-generations in the same house. As a consequence, a great proportion of the elderly patients can be looked after by their relatives at home instead of by professional human resources at institutions (Ogawa 1993: 139).
The ageing population in Japan will also have a very negative impact in Japanese administrations. In the majority of industrial nations government deficits have been reduced during the last ten years, however, in Japan the fiscal situation has not improved whatsoever (Faruqee and Muhleisen 2003: 189). This situation is aggravated by the “ageing population” because they will demand an increase in the cost of health services and in the pension payments having as a consequence a direct impact on the expenditure side (Faruqee and Muhleisen 2003: 189). Thus, the current deficit aggravated by the aging population will demand drastic measures to adjust the fiscal situation (Faruqee and Muhleisen 2003: 189).
4. In the Future
4.1 Possible Solutions
In order to overturn the alarming results that ageing could cost to economic and social systems different policies have been considered in order to mitigate or reverse those tendencies. One of the most popular strategy applied in developed countries are “pronatalist policies”. According to a report produce by Grant and others about Low Fertility and Ageing Population in Europe they conclude that although there is no single policy recommended to affect fertility it is about a combination of them. They say that in order to increase fertility rate levels there must be an initiative from the governments to influence people to reproduce (Grant, Hoorens, Sivadasan, van het Loo, DaVanzo, Hale, Gibson and Butz 2004: 136-137). They illustrate this position with the example of France and Spain . Today France has the second highest rate of fertility in Europe – the first is Ireland- , and the most interventionist policies from government to make people reproduce. They observe that France was the first country in Europe to experience fertility rate decline, and its population was absolutely conscious and concerned about its impact (Grant, Hoorens, Sivadasan, van het Loo, DaVanzo, Hale, Gibson and Butz 2004: 136). As a result the Family Planning Code in 1939 was drafted and since then Family Planning has been of high priority in the Political Agenda (Grant, Hoorens, Sivadasan, van het Loo, DaVanzo, Hale, Gibson and Butz 2004: 136).
On the other hand, Spain has the second lowest fertility rate of the EU – the first is Italy . During Franco pronatalist policies Spain used to have the second highest fertility rate that dramatically declined when the government changed the approach of its management (Grant, Hoorens, Sivadasan, van het Loo, DaVanzo, Hale, Gibson and Butz 2004: 136). From “prohibiting contraception and honoring large families” under Franco regime to relaying on the families the decision of birth since the onset of democracy made Spain to change the second highest fertility rate for the second lowest fertility rate position among the EU countries (Grant, Hoorens, Sivadasan, van het Loo, DaVanzo, Hale, Gibson and Butz 2004: 136).
Because the results of pronatalist policies are seen in the long-term another strategy is needed. The US has successfully implemented immigration in order to decrease the negative impacts of ageing. In the last decade the US has received 11 million of immigrants. This figure is relatively high compared with 6 million in the 1970s and 7 million in the 1980s (The Economist 2004). Immigration in the US not only makes US numbers higher than Europe but also those numbers has a different implication for the American population. Most of the immigrants come from Latin American countries, which in places like Los Angeles and Houston account for fifty percent of the children bellow 14 (The Economist 2004). Conversely, the reluctance of Europe to adopt an open immigration is elevating the costs of this problem.
Other policies that are frequently mentioned are (Helgerson 2002): a) rising retirement ages, which is consistent with the good health conditions of elder people. Today a man or a woman of 65 can be compared with the physical conditions of someone of 40 fifty years ago. Prof. Guest comments: “Older people are getting more health, so they will be physically able to work for longer. The nature of work is changing, it's not as physically demanding.” (Dullroy 2005: 12); b) reducing benefits, this is being considered in many countries as an imminent policy; c) encouraging more participation of woman in the workforce.
It can be concluded as Helgerson (2002) observes that: “no single policy initiative is likely to be sufficient to alleviate the pressures caused by aging population” and more creative solutions and multidisciplinary approach is needed to address the complexity of this issue.
4.2 A place on the Agenda
In October 2005 one of the major concerns in the western security environment is “Terrorism” especially in the US and in its allies' agendas. As a result, what sort of place could Population and more precisely “ageing population” can occupy in a post September 11 agendas? First, it is important to make a fundamental distinction between hard or core issues and soft security issues. In the category of soft security issues can be identified: “population, refugees, narcotics, people trafficking and smuggling, international organized crime, environmental degradation; and cyber crime” (Keely 2003: 197). Soft security issues are those which are not executed by the use of military force, and the response or reaction to them does not implied the use of military force either (Keely 2003: 197).
In addition to the different nature that place soft security in a different category, there is also a tendency to resolve the “last problem or the last war” first ((Keely 2003: 197). While a recent terrorist attack is measurable in material loss, human loss, damage and casualties can be seen, touched and regret, the impact that ageing population will have for taxpayers and for welfare systems are no more than “projections” that could in extreme cases be erroneous.
Another reason that places “ageing population” in a low priority level in the security agenda is that although demographic changes can advance and alert security problems “the relationship between population changes and violent conflicts is not unidirectional (Goldstone 2002: 17). However, as Tir and Dhiel observe: “The relationship is modest, but seems to confirm the most pessimistic views” (1998:336). In other words, the lack of use of military force in the perpetration and in the response of the threat of “ageing population” place the issue in the “NON PRIORITY” section of the international security agenda.
5. Conclusion
The world population is getting older and in western developed countries this process has already been producing its effects. The ageing population is mainly the result of low fertility and low mortality rates and its devastating effects will not only affect economic and welfare system but also military decisions. Although the catastrophic changes that have been advanced in countries such as Japan and some members of the European Union, ageing has not been translated as a priority issue in the international security agenda.
By their very nature, soft security issues are non tangible in the present time, they are regarded as possible scenarios that can or cannot occur and as a result they are neglected by national security strategic planning. Today our attention can be driven by terrorist attacks that unfortunately have produce tangible casualties and threat the survival of some governments and political regimes. Addressing soft security issues such as ageing with some kind of priority seems to be outside the security and the political agenda. It is outside the former because non military force is involve in their perpetration or in the required responses, and in the latter because this kind of issue will not represent a great difference in the number of votes that can be obtained in an electoral campaign. Prioritizing soft security issues is a political responsibility that will be claimed by future generations, when probably current politicians – although they will enjoy longevity- will no longer exist.
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